Kerkuk: The Iraqi Turkmens' Capital city and main Cultural Centre
In an article published in Zaman called: “ICG expert: “Kirkuk deal could serve both Turks, Kurds” ICG expert Joost R. Hiltermann makes some biased declarations and is misinforming his readers.
Note how he uses the word “regain” when he speaks of Iraqi Kurds wanting to “regain” Kerkuk.
As if Kerkuk had been a Kurdish city in the past and belonged to the Kurds!
Then he declares: “The Kurdish parties and most other communities in Kirkuk have not resorted to violence.”
This is a lie, everyone knows that the Kurdish parties (with their armed militias, the Peshmerga) used force and ill-treated the Turkmens and Arabs in Kerkuk when they penetrated into the city in April 2003 to impose their hegemony against the will of the Turkmen, Arab and Assyrian inhabitants of the city.
But it is true to affirm that the Turkmens, who do not have armed militias, have never resorted to violence.
Mr. Hiltermann, as an expert, should know that:
On 10th April 2003, hundreds of Peshmerga forces from the PUK entered Kerkuk with the blessing of the U.S. authorities (in defiance of a prior agreement with the U.S. stating that the Peshmerga forces would remain outside the city) they invaded the Land Registry office, municipality buildings, government offices, military buildings, big hotels and historical military barracks (built in the Ottoman era and used as a museum) they put fire to them after having stolen all the land deeds from the Land Registry office. The Kurdish parties’ militias also looted shops and houses belonging to Turkmens.
They destroyed and burnt Kerkuk’s central library which contained valuable historical books and they brought a Kurdish family from Turkey to occupy the library.
The Kurds stole thousands of all types of government vehicles, luxury cars, buses and shuffles. A large number of private cars were confiscated and stolen in front of their Turkmen and Arab owners. Thousands of heavy transporting vehicles, trucks, ambulances and Iraqi governmental cars were taken away by the Kurds, later they dismantled them and sold them as spare parts.
They also removed and dismantled high voltage transformers and pylons to sell them as scrap. Kurds looted the governmental supermarket ‘Sooq al-Markazi’ in Kerkuk and later put fire to it.
The Kurds provoked the Turkmen, Arab and Assyrian communities in Kerkuk by raising Kurdish flags on all government buildings. They even hoisted the Kurdish flag on private Turkmen properties. They changed the names of governmental buildings from Arabic to Kurdish and they illegally appointed a non-elected Kurdish governor in Kerkuk. They changed the names of most of Kerkuk’s streets and hospitals replacing them by Kurdish names.
Kurds threatened Arab families who had been living in Kerkuk for over a decade and forced them to leave the city.
See Mr Mofak Salman Kerkuklu’s book: “TURKMEN OF IRAQ”
ISBN-978-0-9555489-0-1
In which the exactions committed by the Kurds in Kerkuk and other cities in the north of Iraq are exposed in detail (with many photographs).
Article published in Zaman:ICG expert: Kirkuk deal could serve both Turks, Kurds
26 May 2008, Monday.
Joost R. Hiltermann, deputy Middle East and North Africa program director of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a nongovernmental organization dedicated to conflict prevention, said the Iraqi Kurdish administration would be of more help in Turkey's fight against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism if only they could get concessions on Kirkuk; however, this is a "zero-sum game" which could be turned into a "win-win situation.
Iraqi Kurds want to regain Kirkuk, and they know that the main obstacle to that ambition is Turkey. So why would they help Turkey by presenting them the PKK on a platter?" Hiltermann asked in an interview with Monday Talk.
He said the Iraqi Kurdish administration wants to get Kirkuk because of its oil reserves and historical importance, noting that it wants to develop its own oil resources there. However, disagreements between the Kurds and the central government over the Kurdish rights to develop their own oil fields are also preventing Kurdish ambitions.
"In a potential package deal, the Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG] in Iraq would gain the rights to develop its own oil fields. In exchange they would not incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region. And it may become a stand-alone region with a power sharing arrangement," he elaborated.
As part of that deal, he said, the Iraqi Kurdish administration would restrain the PKK's freedom to maneuver: "If Turkey then also agrees to an amnesty for lower and mid-level officials [of the PKK] and lets refugees from the Makhmour camp return safely to Turkey, the KRG in exchange will absorb the senior levels of the PKK -- they will be disarmed, of course, and no longer politically active."
According to Hiltermann, this could serve everyone because Turkey could help the land-locked northern Iraq region develop its oil resources and ship the oil out, Turkey would not have to fear Kurdish independence, and the Kurds would not have to fear the strength of the central Iraqi government because they would have international guarantees provided by the deal reached.
For Monday Talk, Hiltermann elaborates more on the fate of the disputed city, Iraq and Turkey's mediating efforts in the region.
Most of the ICG reports from the Middle East concern developments in Iraq. Where is Iraq heading in the post-Saddam era?
The situation in Iraq after 2003 has been serious. There is a growing failure on the part of the United States to keep the country together. It removed the state apparatus, police, army and managerial class, and they were not replaced by anything. There are a lot of non-state actors, such as guerillas, insurgent groups and militias. There is a growing sectarianism and an actual conflict. So there was a real threat two years ago that the country would fall apart. Then the [George W.] Bush administration got engaged in the so-called "surge" of military forces -- in Baghdad in particular. This was a desperate last attempt to correct the situation. And it has succeeded, somewhat, in stabilizing the situation, especially in Baghdad.
Are these gains sustainable?
This greatly depends on what the new administration in the White House will do. The Bush administration is a lame duck. It will take time for the new president to put a team together and then forge a new strategy. But one positive thing has come out of this; namely, that all of the neighboring states and also the Unites States all agreed Iraq should not fall apart as this would be very harmful to all neighboring states' interests and to the region. This is one reason that the situation in Iraq has not gotten out of hand. So we will see what the US military will accomplish, considering that there is an offensive in Mosul. The military is also trying to address the problem of Shiite militias. We would have to wait until a new president comes into the White House with a new strategy. We hope the new president will be someone who will include engagement with Iran and Syria because without them, Iraq cannot be stabilized.
Is northern Iraq still the safest area?
By far, yes. Iraqi Kurdistan has been relatively stable and safe for people ever since 2003 and even before, since 1991. This does not mean bombs do not go off -- they do, but not anything compared to the rest of Iraq.
What is the situation in Kirkuk?
Kirkuk has been very tense though it hasn't seen the kind of violence that Baghdad has. The situation there has been contained, maybe against expectations, because of the stakes -- a lot of the oil in the ground, a mix of communities and of course a drive by the Kurdish parties to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region. The Kurdish parties and most other communities in Kirkuk have not resorted to violence.
The violence [in Kirkuk] has come mostly from al-Qaeda in Iraq and some insurgent groups. We are now waiting for the United Nations to come up with a new initiative to replace the process that was under way under the constitution, the Article 140 process, which did not produce a referendum by the December 2007 deadline.
The referendum has now been delayed until June 30. Do you expect it to be held then?
It's very unlikely and the Kurdish leaders know very well that it won't happen by June 30. That's why the UN initiative is so important because they will have to come up with a process that is accepted by all parties, including the Kurds, and that will lead to progress on settling the issue of disputed territories.
A series of constitutional requirements, including a pre-vote census, have not been fulfilled. Is there a reason to be hopeful that these requirements will be met? After all, aren't the Kurds claiming the same rights over Kirkuk?
Yes, the Kurds are claiming Kirkuk and they had hoped to include Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region through a referendum under Article 140 of the constitution. For the Kurds, two principles matter: One, the status of Kirkuk is based on the will of the people of Kirkuk and, two, that the constitutional framework is adhered to. But Article 140 of the constitution is rather vague on what should happen.
It just says there has to be normalization, which is a return to the situation before Arabization took off in 1967 -- when the Baath Party came to power -- a census and a referendum. There is nothing in the constitution that says you cannot negotiate over Kirkuk prior to a referendum which would then ratify the decision taken consensually by various parties in Kirkuk. So what the United Nations is now trying to do is seek points that everybody can agree on so that there can be a basis for negotiation. It will not meet everyone's maximum objectives -- and that is not possible because they are clashing -- but it may meet everyone's minimum requirements.
So Kurds believe Kirkuk is theirs but there is not much American support behind them now compared to 2003, right?
Kurds were expelled from Kirkuk by force in past decades. They now have the opportunity to regain it because they have power in Baghdad. As long as they see that they have the opportunity, they will push. But the window of opportunity -- first opened in 1991 and opened more widely in 2003 -- has started to close because Americans who supported the Kurds started to recalibrate power relations in Iraq because they realized that things were getting out of control and the only way to re-stabilize the situation during the surge was to reach out to the Sunni Arabs who then started to set up these Awakening Councils [armed neighborhood groups that have driven al-Qaeda out of many districts of Baghdad and elsewhere].
This meant the Kurds and the Shiite Islamist parties take a step back and make certain compromises. This is where we are now. It will require some time for the Kurdish parties and the Kurdish people to come to the realization that they will not be able to meet the maximum objectives in Iraq today. And once that happens, we can reach consensus.
As Kurds increase their influence in Iraq, wouldn't they be interested in more?
Jalal Talabani, who was the head of one Kurdish guerilla party, is now the president of Iraq. There is no doubt that Kurds have expanded their influence in Iraq. But Kurds have no interest in running Iraq. They have an interest in Kurdish independence. This is what they are working toward: trying to expand the territory under their control and their powers within that territory. Of course, with territory also come resources, especially oil, but also water and gas. This is very important to them because they have been massacred in the past by the central governments in Iraq and they don't want that to happen again.
How does that perspective of the Kurds concern Turkey, where most worry about Kurdish independence?
What is most important for Turkey is Iraq's territorial integrity. If Iraq falls apart, if Turkey cannot prevent Iraq's disintegration, then paradoxically Turkey might have an interest in a stable Iraqi Kurdistan that would serve as a buffer between Turkey and the chaos of Iraq. In that case, it would be in Turkey's interest to develop good relations with Iraqi Kurdistan -- economic, political and diplomatic. Both the Turkish leadership and the Kurdish leadership have a strong belief in secularism; they know they need each other because Iraqi Kurdistan has oil even if Kirkuk is not included. Turkey is interested in getting it out from under the ground and shipping it to Turkey, to Ceyhan.
What are the advantages from the Iraqi Kurdish perspective?
It's a land-locked region. It is forever going to be dependant on its neighbors. Turkey has been the main transit country for its goods. There is a potential for a good relationship and the only thing against it is chauvinism on the parts of both, Turkish chauvinism and Kurdish chauvinism, and that's unfortunate. If we can continue to encourage development in Iraqi Kurdistan and relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, then we can overcome these psychological factors.
There is also the PKK's presence in northern Iraq. Do you think chauvinism breeds the PKK violence?
Turkey has an issue with the Kurds in Turkey, and this is an issue to be addressed. Since I'm not an expert on Turkey, I won't go into that. But the PKK is a symptom of that. And to the extent that the PKK is present in Iraqi Kurdistan, it becomes an issue for Iraq as well. And it becomes an issue for Turkish relations with Iraq and Turkish relations with the KRG. But this is manageable. The KRG supports the PKK up to a point, not because it likes the PKK but because it sees it as a bargaining chip. For Turkey, the PKK's presence in northern Iraq is very important and it tries to address it by putting political pressure on the KRG to take steps against the PKK -- by military means as well, though not very effectively. I'm very pleased to see that we now have the first senior level meeting between the Turkish government and the KRG.
Following the US-led military operation to topple Saddam Hussein, in a report you had written back in 2003 you warned of a threat of large-scale violence centered in Kirkuk erupting in northern Iraq between Kurds and Turks.
How do you think such a catastrophe was averted?
One thing that averted an open conflict was the Turkish Parliament's decision on March 1, 2003 not to grant transit rights to the American forces. Because that would have given Turkish forces the opportunity to also go into northern Iraq alongside the American forces, and this would have brought them into direct confrontation with the Kurdish parties and their militias. I don't know how that would have been managed. That could have led to an entirely different situation in Kirkuk than what we see today. Now it's a question of managing the future so that conflict can be avoided in the longer term. As long as we see a clash in Kirkuk, not of two but of three nationalisms -- Kurdish, Arab and Turkish -- there is a huge potential for conflict.
Is there much concern by the international community on the status of Turkmens who have been subject to unfair treatment?
The United Nations wants to find a solution to the status of Kirkuk that is consensual and that builds in protections for communities -- for Kurds, for Arabs, for Turkmens, for everyone -- so they can live peacefully. The Iraqi regime prior to 2003 also expelled the Turkmens from Kirkuk, confiscated their property and labeled them Arabs in national censuses. Turkmens deserve protection in Kirkuk.
Turkey is now mediating between Syria and Israel. Do you think it will open the way for the United States to engage with Syria?
It's very helpful for Turkey to get involved in this because it can talk to both sides and to the Palestinians. Turkey has good relations with all three. But without the United States and its leverage, there isn't going to be progress on either the Israel-Syria track or the Israel-Palestinian track. There is a lame duck administration in the White House, and we may have to wait for the next president.
Do you think Turkey could mediate between Iran and the United States?
The current standoff between Iran and the United States is not helpful to Turkey. Turkey does not want to alienate Iran, but the United States is alienating Iran. In the triangle of the United States, Iran and Turkey, Turkey feels uncomfortable at the moment because of the Bush administration's stance. If that changes -- all the candidates in the United States, John McCain, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, have indicated they are much more multilateral in their approach than the Bush administration -- then Turkey could play a very useful role alongside the European Union in negotiating safeguards in Iran that will prevent the ostensibly peaceful program from being turned into a military one.
Joost R. Hiltermann
Joost R. Hiltermann is the deputy Middle East and North Africa program director of the International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent nongovernmental organization dedicated to conflict prevention and headquartered in Brussels. Most recently he prepared studies on the lack of political progress in Iraq during the surge; the politics of the Supreme Council, one of Iraq's Shiite Islamist parties; and the conflict over Kirkuk. From 1994 to 2002 he served as the executive director of the arms division of Human Rights Watch in Washington. Prior to that, he was a Middle East consultant for international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, conducting investigations in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Palestine and Lebanon. He also worked for the Palestinian human rights organization al-Haq in Ramallah. He holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and his dissertation was published by Princeton University Press, titled "Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories." Hiltermann is also the author of "A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja," published last year.
Zaman
