Sunday, 30 September 2012

Will Shell Take The Leap Into Iraq’s Kurdistan?

Friday, September 28, 2012

Will Shell Take The Leap Into Iraq’s Kurdistan?

Published in Musings on Iraq

There are some contradictory stories emerging about whether oil major Royal Dutch Shell is in negotiations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Twice before it was in talks with the Kurds, but withdrew to protect its investments in southern Iraq. Now the equation has slightly changed. It has secured all of the contracts it was interested in with the Oil Ministry, while other large oil corporations have taken the leap to work in Kurdistan. It could now very well follow their lead and move north as well. That would seemingly break with the conservative mold it has forged so far, while working in the country.

When it comes to oil companies deciding to defy Baghdad and signing a deal with Kurdistan, all news reports have to be taken with a large grain of salt. On September 21, 2012, Reuters had a story that Shell was considering working in Kurdistan. The article claimed that it was inspired by the fact that other major oil companies such as Exxon Mobil and Total had recently signed contracts with the KRG, and Baghdad had taken no serious action against them. Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani’s office denied that story, and the central government allegedly threatened to blacklist Shell if it went to the north. There was another piece that stated the company had backed out of talks, because of those warnings. More importantly, a Shell spokesman said that while the company would eventually like to work in all parts of Iraq, at the time it was happy with its operations in the south. It would not be surprising if Shell were considering working in Kurdistan, because its terms are much better than those offered by the Oil Ministry. At the same time, many firms do not get paid, have to rely upon the hope that their stock prices will go up with any discoveries they make there, and the region relies upon short-term deals with Baghdad in order to export. The central government has also threatened to sanction any company that moves north, but its stories about majors dropping negotiations with the KRG or halting their work have consistently been wrong. Right now it is impossible to tell which direction Shell will take on the matter. However, one could look at their past history.

Twice before Shell was in talks with Kurdish officials. That occurred in 2007 and 2011. The first time, the Oil Ministry had not opened up to foreign investment yet, but Kurdistan had. Details of the matter are not clear, but it would appear Shell decided to wait until the central government offered up the much larger southern petroleum fields. In 2011, the company was finalizing a natural gas deal in Basra province, and did not want to jeopardize that. That showed a conservative streak within the company that could point to its future actions. Shell may again be unwilling to go north if it thinks its projects in the south are more important.

The Majnoon field is one of two that Shell has invested in (Wall Street Journal)

Shell currently has three contracts with the central government. One is for the Majnoon field in Basra, which it has a joint venture with Malaysia’s Petronas. Shell is expected to invest between $2.5-$3 billion into that project by the middle of next year, out of a total of $50 billion. It is also a junior partner with Exxon in Basra’s West Qurna 1. Finally, it has a $17 billion deal with Mitsubishi to collect natural gas from several fields in Basra, which took three years to finalize. As part of that endeavor, it has signed a memorandum of understanding to build a petrochemical plant as well. The company’s work has not gone smoothly in the south. Its natural gas project is still caught up in red tape. It claims that it is losing ¢60 per barrel on the Majnoon field, and won’t start getting paid until the first half of 2013 when it will reach its first production target of 175,000 barrels per day. It is then supposed to start earning $1.39 per barrel, but the actual amount will be less as it has to pay a ¢35 tax. Its payments for West Qurna 1 have been caught up in the bureaucracy as well. Shell obviously has a huge amount of money invested in southern Iraq, and plans on putting in a lot more. That includes the largest natural gas deal in the country, which has huge potential. It’s for those reasons, that it was unwilling to make the leap into Kurdistan in the past. That being said, it is facing problems dealing with Baghdad. That’s because of the unwieldy government that seems to make even the most mundane matters difficult. Working in the KRG is much easier, and a major draw.

Shell could go either way when it comes to its talks with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In the past, it has been weary of giving up its endeavors with the central government. It has been willing to deal with Baghdad, and even expand its operations in the south. At the same time, its profits look to be slim, Kurdistan offers a much easier business environment, and official threats of retaliation by the Oil Ministry appear to be feckless. Shell has followed a conservative course in Iraq however. That would point to it staying the course, and concentrating upon its three contracts in Basra rather than taking the jump into the north. That doesn’t mean it won’t follow that path in the future. Still, further details will have to emerge before Shell’s ultimate decision can be determined.


AK News, “Facts and figures: oil and transparency in Iraq,” 5/27/12

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq signs deal with Shell to set up huge petrochemical plant,” 4/6/12

Bertrand, Pierre, “ExxonMobil’s Iraq Oil Field Contract Could go to Lukoil, Shell,” International Business Times, 11/30/11

Dow Jones, Reuters, “Shell to Replace Exxon at West Qurna 1?” Iraq Business News, 11/21/11

Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraq in Initial Gas Accord With Shell,” Wall Street Journal, 7/12/11

International Crisis Group, “Iraq And The Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit,” 4/19/12

Kramer, Andrew and Werdigier, Julia, “Exxon Spars With Iraq Over Lack of Payment,” New York Times, 12/22/11

Mackey, Peg, “Shell again weighs energy openings in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Reuters, 9/21/12

Mackey, Peg and Callus, Andrew, “Insight: Oil’s big players raise the stakes in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Reuters, 8/5/12

Markey, Patrick and Mackey, Peg, “Analysis: In Iraq, oil majors play north versus south,” Reuters, 4/5/12

Pfeifer, Sylvia and Blas, Javier, “Shell pulls out of Kurdistan oil talks,” Financial Times, 11/16/11

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Exclusive: Shell in talks to cut Iraq’s Majnoon output target,” Reuters, 5/8/12

Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq Approves $17 Billion Gas Deal With Shell, Mitsubishi,” Bloomberg, 11/15/11

Reuters, “Iraq says Shell denies oil talks with Kurdistan,” 9/26/12
- “Shell to start pumping gas at southern Iraq project,” 7/11/12

Shafaq News, “Shell withdraw from Kurdistan negotiations after hours of Baghdad threats,” 9/23/12

Yackley, Ayla Jean, “Shell sees Majnoon resuming oil output in Q1,” Reuters, 9/18/12

Saturday, 29 September 2012

Black Friday for Turkmens in Kirkuk

Two of our relatives killed in a bomb attack targeting Turkmens in Kirkuk

On 7th September 2012, a series of coordinated bombings targeting three Shiite mosques in Kirkuk killed at least eight people and wounded thirty-six.

Our cousin Ali Djellil (aged 40) and one of his sons (aged 12) were among the dead, they were blown to pieces when leaving the mosque after Friday prayers. Our cousin is leaving a wife and five children, the youngest is a six year old girl.

A bomb had been placed in a parked car near the mosque.
A second bomb exploded after the police and rescuers rushed to the scene.
Both bombs killed a total of eight and wounded 36.

Three other bombs targeted two more Shiite mosques in the centre of the city, injuring 34 people.

The Head of the Turkmen Front, Mr. Ershad Al-Salihi and ITF Turkey representative Dr Hicran Kazanci have strongly condemned these attacks in a press statement.

Meanwhile Prime Minister Al-Maliki continues to ignore the Turkmens’ repeated demands to form protection units composed of Turkmens to protect Turkmen neighbourhoods, thus leaving the Turkmen population unprotected and very vulnerable. 

As Violence Increases in Kirkuk the Turkmens Are Targeted
Bilgay Duman, ORSAM Middle East Specialist
12 September 2012

Kirkuk, which has become a deadlock in Iraq, took a knock due to the acts of violence again. Within the last 4 days many people have been killed and injured, as Turkmen officials have directly been targeted and also due to the attacks carried out against places such as mosques, market places etc. with lots of people. The chain of attacks carried out against the Turkmen for a week had been launched with the assassination against Major General Adnan Abdurrezzak, an official of Turkmen origin at the Office of the Ministry of Interior in Kirkuk Governor's Office on September 4. Abdurrezzak, who went grocery shopping during evening hours, was assassinated in the market along with his two security guards. While the following day during noontime the Prosecutor Emel Ahmet Kayacı, official in the Court of Tuzhurmatu in Salahaddin, and his security guard were assassinated; during evening hours of the same day the home of Ali Haşim Muhtaroğlu, ITF (Iraqi Turkmen Front) Deputy Head and Salahaddin Provincial Council Member, was attacked. But it is reported that luckily everybody escaped unharmed from the attack.

Eight explosions hit Kirkuk on Friday September 7. While the fact that most of the explosions took place in husayniyya (Shiite mosque) and in mosques during the Friday prayer draws the attention, the fact that the explosions mostly take place in Tisin, Domis, Atlas Streets and in areas such as Musalla suggests that Turkmens have still been targetedThe fact that attacks are mostly carried out in Turkmen neighborhoods, that Turkmen officials are directly targeted brought up the issue of protection for the Turkmen to the agenda again. As the Turkmen officials urgently emphasize; especially in Kirkuk the lack of forces to protect Turkmens and insufficiency of the forces affiliated to the current government lead Turkmens to be damaged the most. Even if Turkmens are not directly targeted, Turkmens which are the least protected group in Kirkuk are damaged the most. 

As it is known, in Kirkuk, there are peshmerga and public order forces of Kurdish parties as well as police forces of the Iraqi central government. The aforesaid forces can easily protect the Kurdish neighborhoods. On the other hand, it is known that Sunni Arab tribes also have armed forces. As a matter of fact the majority of Sahwa, local forces created to fight against Al-Qaeda, is composed of Sunni Arabs. Currently, the needs (including their salaries) of Sahwa Forces are provided by the Iraqi central government. However, Turkmens do not have such forces. Besides, it is known that the number of Turkmens are less than the other groups within the security forces of the Iraqi government. Thus, problems take place in protecting Turkmens and Turkmen neighborhoods, and the places where acts of violence are witnessed the most are the Turkmen areas such as Tisin, Baghdad Road etc.

In addition to the fact that Turkmens do not have an armed force, it is also Turkmens who are damaged the most as a result of the conflict in Iraqi domestic politics regarding Kirkuk. Currently, there is a struggle between Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi central government to control Kirkuk. The Iraqi government led by Nouri Al-Maliki has been striving to increase its control over Kirkuk, and to this end, the government has been trying both to draw anti-Kurdish groups, including Sunni Arabs, to their side and also to increase its military power. For example, Maliki formed the Tigris Operations Command, directly affiliated to the Prime Ministry, in order to take security measures in Kirkuk as well as Diyala and Salahaddin. Despite the fact that Kurdish and Turkmen members in Kirkuk Provincial Council opposed to this, the Tigris Operations Command de facto took office. Kurds and Turkmens are concerned about the possibility that it would only be composed of Sunni Arabs. If the objective is to protect Kirkuk, Turkmens demand the formation of a “Kirkuk Force”, which would only be composed of people from Kirkuk and which would include all components living in Kirkuk. Nevertheless, it seems hard to accept this suggestion due to the political stance.

However, the real threat especially for Turkmens is considered to be the effort to create a sectarian conflict in Kirkuk. Because it is important to note that most of the explosions on September 7 targeted husayniyyas. If this situation increasingly continues, it might lead to a sectarian conflict in Kirkuk. The most damaged group would be Turkmens. Because almost all Arabs and Kurds in Kirkuk are Sunni. But there are both Shiites and Sunnis among the Turkmen in Kirkuk. In case a potential sectarian conflict takes place, Turkmens might become polarized (even if a low possibility). It is important to note that Turkmens are politically divided in Kirkuk. Shiite Turkmen parties formed a Turkmen coalition. Even though their goal is to form a Turkmen unity, the fact that this coalition only includes Shiite Turkmen parties might be considered as the major obstacle before creating this unity.Even during the most violent sectarian conflict in Iraq, sectarian problems did not take place among Turkmens in Kirkuk which is the stronghold of the Turkmen identity. Nevertheless, the consequences of such a situation to directly take place in Kirkuk might not be in favor of Turkmens. Therefore, it would be good for Turkmen institutions and organizations, Turkmen people and particularly for Turkmen politicians to be moderate. It can be assessed that there might be those who would want to prevent the rise of Turkmens in the Iraqi politics in the recent period. Turkmens are the balance factor in Kirkuk. There might be some groups that would like to create division among Turkmens. Because whenever Turkmens act in unison with any group, it is highly possible that the aforesaid group will become stronger. Disturbing this balance would bring grief not only to Turkmens but also to Kirkuk in general. And a major trouble to take place in Kirkuk would easily reflect badly on all across Iraq.

Below are some articles reporting the bomb attacks of 7 September 2012:

Iraq: Multiple Bombings Kill 8 at Mosques inKirkuk
Published: September 7, 2012
Three separate bomb attacks against Shiite mosques in the northern city of Kirkuk killed eight civilians on Friday and wounded 70 others, the police said. The attacks took place as worshippers were leaving the mosques, said the Kirkuk police commander, Brig. Gen. Sarhad Qadir. He said the deadliest attack occurred when a parked car bomb went off in Kirkuk’s southern Domiz area. A second bomb exploded after the police and rescuers rushed to the scene. Those explosions killed a total of eight people and wounded 36. At two other mosques in the center of the city, three bombs wounded 34 people.

SULAIMANIYAH, Iraq (AP) – Three separate bomb attacks against Shiite mosques in a volatile northern Iraqi city killed eight civilians on Friday and injured 70 others, police said.

Citizens and security forces inspect the scene of a car bomb attack in KirkukIraqon Friday.
By Emad Matti, AP
Kirkuk police commander Brig. Gen. Sarhad Qadir said the blasts took place as worshipers were leaving mosques

Qadir said the deadliest attack occurred when a parked car bomb went off in Kirkuk's southern Domiz area.

A second bomb exploded after police and rescuers rushed to the scene. Both bombs killed a total of eight and wounded 36.

Three other bombs targeted two more mosques in the center of the city, causing 34 injuries but no fatalities.

Eight killed in Kirkuk bomb attacks

String of bomb attacks targeting Shiite places of worship kills at
least eight people, wounds 33 others.

Middle East Online

KIRKUK, Iraq - A series of apparently coordinated bombings
targeting Shiite places of worship, or husseiniyahs, in north Iraq
killed at least eight people and wounded 33 on Friday, a medical
official said.

A car bomb targeted the Khezal al-Tamimi husseiniyah in central
Kirkuk at about 12:55 pm (0955 GMT), followed by a bombing
at Imam Ali husseiniyah in the city's northeast, and three bombings
at Al-Mustafa  husseiniyah in south Kirkuk, security and medical
officials said.

Sadiq Omar Rasul, the head of Kirkuk health department, said
that  eight people were killed and 33 wounded in the attacks.

An AFP correspondent saw the burned bodies of two children and
dozens of burned-out cars at Al-Mustafa husseiniyah.

Hadi Qanbar, who had been praying at Al-Mustafa husseiniyah,
said that worshippers were told about the attack on Khezal
al-Tamimi and began to leave.

"But when we left, explosions happened one after another," he said.
 "We do not know why we were targeted."

Azhar Kamal, who was also at Al-Mustafa husseiniyah, said: "We
put the blood of the victims on the hands of the prime minister, and
we ask him to protect the people of Kirkuk."

Hassan Hussein, who was at Khezal al-Tamimi at the time of the
attack, said the explosion happened behind the husseiniyah.

"We saw our brothers and friends killed and wounded by this
explosion," he said.

Thursday, 20 September 2012

Iraq’s Central And Regional Governments Reach Third Oil Deal, But Will It Last?

In September 2012, Baghdad and Irbil announced that they had come to a new agreement over Kurdish oil exports. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) halted their petroleum shipments in April over a payment dispute with the central government. It then started them again in August hoping that would lead to a new deal, which has now happened. There are two important and unresolved issues however. The first is whether the Kurds can meet their quotas, because they weren’t able to do so the last time they exported. The second is whether Baghdad can be counted on to consistently distribute funds to the energy companies working in Kurdistan, which was the issue that led the last two deals to break down. Both of those are likely to come up again, making this latest agreement, perhaps just as short term as the others.

In mid-September 2012, Baghdad and Kurdistan negotiated a new export deal. This came as a result of a meeting headed by Deputy Premier Rowsch Nouri Shaways that included Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, Trade Minister Khayrulla Hassan Babakir, Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi, the head of the Board of Supreme Audit, and KRG Natural Resource Minister Ashti Hawrami. The two sides came to a five-part agreement. First, the Kurds said they would export 140,000 barrels a day for the rest of September, and then increase that amount to 200,000 barrels for the rest of the year. Second, Baghdad would pay companies operating in Kurdistan $833 million. Third, the two would work out an export quota and payments to be included in the 2013 budget. Fourth, Baghdad would provide 17% of refined oil products and 17% of fuel to the KRG for its power stations. Finally, two committees would be formed to keep track of production, remunerations, oversee the agreement, and try to resolve any problems that might arise. These were all issues that led to the breakdown of the last deal between the two. The Kurds for instance, accused Baghdad of cuttings its fuel shipments. Now the central and regional governments have supposedly worked out their differences. It also has two mechanisms to try to problem solve any issues that may come up this time around. This move was widely hailed in the press.

The new agreement was the result of the breakdown of the last one. On April 1, Kurdistan halted its exports, claiming that Baghdad owed companies there $1.5 billion. Kurdish officials told the press that firms in the region had not been paid for their exports from 2009 and 2011. The central government countered that the KRG never provided invoices for its exports to be audited, so that payments could be made. Four months later on August 7, the Kurds’ Natural Resource Ministry restarted sending oil through the northern pipeline to Turkey, hoping that it would lead to a breakthrough with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. At the time, the KRG was coming under increasing pressure from oil companies there over money. Norway’s DNO for instance, reported a loss in August, and that it had to ramp down production at the Tawke field in Dohuk, because it could not export. The few companies that produce oil in Kurdistan only make small amounts of cash either from selling to the domestic market there or through smuggling to Turkey and Iran, both of which pay below international prices. Having a deal with Baghdad only covers costs, but that is still more than they are currently being paid. This was the second time that relations between Baghdad and Irbil had broken down, so businesses were pushing Kurdistan to come to a firmer and longer lasting agreement with Maliki’s government, so that they could earn a steady income from their large investments in the KRG. It was for these reasons that the Natural Resource Ministry re-started exports in August. The problem is that there is no guarantee that Baghdad will keep up their payments, because they haven’t in the past. That could bring down this new deal just like it did the last two.

Another major issue is whether the KRG can reach its quotas. The Natural Resource Ministry has made many lofty claims about the potential of the region’s energy sector. Before, they said that Kurdistan could reach 200,000 barrels a day in exports by the end of 2011, an average of 400,000 barrels by the end of 2012, and 1 million by 2014. The problem is that it has never come close to any of these figures. In January 2011, Baghdad and Irbil reached their second deal over exports. The Kurds were to export 150,000 barrels a day as set in the 2011 budget, and then175,000 barrels for the 2012 budget. When the details of this agreement were being worked out in early 2011 however, Kurdish officials said that they could only produce 100,000 barrels a day at the time, and wanted that to be their quota. That request was turned down. It turned out the KRG was able to quickly ramp up their exports, starting at 10,500 barrels in February, then 75,000 barrels later that month, rising to 100,000 barrels in March, and 115, 000 in April. By June, it finally hit an average of 175,000 barrels a day. The Natural Resource Ministry claimed it maintained that level all the way to March 2012, but Baghdad and the press said otherwise. A November article said that Kurdistan was only exporting 79,000 barrels a day that month, and 75,000 the next. In March, the KRG started complaining about the lack of payments, and stated that it had cut exports to 50,000 barrels a day to protest the matter. When Kurdistan re-started shipments in August it was at 100,000-120,000 barrels. While it only took four months for the region to reach the 175,000 set in the 2012 budget, there are questions about whether it was able to maintain that mark. Reports had exports quickly falling off afterward. Not only that, but some officials in Baghdad have claimed that Kurdistan doesn’t have the pipelines, pumps and other infrastructure to reach its quotas. The KRG will have to disprove these doubts, because it has to double output to 200,000 in just a few weeks under the new agreement. Something the Natural Resource Ministry said it could achieve by the end of last year, but failed to do.

This is the third time that the central and regional governments have cut a deal over oil. In 2009, it only took three months for the first one to fall apart over Baghdad not paying companies in Kurdistan. The second one lasted fourteen months, but then disintegrated over the same issue. There is no reason to believe that this latest one will be any different. The Maliki government has never objected to the Kurds exporting petroleum through the northern pipelines as long as profits are deposited in the central bank. That’s because it gives them control over the dispersal of the money, and allows it to claim that all energy deals have to go through it. The problems are that the KRG has not been able to maintain its quotas, which then draws criticism from Baghdad, and the central government has not kept up its payments. Both issues could be caused by a lack of capacity or political decisions to protest the actions of the other. With oil production and exports taking off in southern Iraq, that gives an added incentive for Premier Maliki to just stick to short-term deals with the Kurds, which can be quickly ended. It gives the central government the upper hand in its long-standing disputes over oil policy since it controls the purse and the pipelines to foreign markets. Rather than a solution, this new deal is likely just one of many that will fall apart, and then have to be re-negotiated in the future.


Agence France Presse, “Iraq pays Kurd oil contractors,” 5/6/11
- “Iraqi Kurdistan confirms oil deal with Baghdad,” 9/14/12

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Iraq’s Deputy Oil Minister Addresses Dispute Between Erbil and Baghdad,” Rudaw, 2/20/12

Ajrash, Kadhim and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq Oil Output Has Reached a 20-Year High, Shahristani Says,” Bloomberg, 12/22/11

AK News, “Kurdistan to produce 400,000 bpd by end of the year,” 3/11/12

Alsumaria, “Kurdistan Oil Exports increase to 100000 bpd,” 3/4/11

Aqrawi, Shamal, “UPDATE 1-Iraq starts exporting Kurdish oil – officials,” Reuters, 2/3/11

Associated Press, “Iraq’s February oil export highest since invasion,” 3/1/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “KA urges federal govt. to pay oil companies’ dues,” 8/3/12

Brosk, Raman, “KRG and Baghdad locked over budget bill and oil exports,” AK News, 1/17/11

Campbell, Robert, “COLUMN-The outsized impact of the Kurdish oil dispute: Campbell,” Reuters, 8/3/12

Carlisle, Tamsin and al Sayegh, Hadeel, “Iraq gives go-ahead to Kurdish oil contracts,” The National, 12/26/10

Chaudhry, Serena, “UPDATE 2-Iraq’s Kurdish region threatens oil export halt,” Reuters, 3/26/12

Chaudhry, Serena and Karouny, Mariam, “Iraq approves $560 mln for Kurdish oil payments,” Reuters, 3/27/12

Dow Jones, “Iraq Kurdish Oil Exports Sliding To 75,000 B/D On Payment Delay – Officials,” 3/12/12
- “Iraqi: KRG To Face Penalties If Oil Exports Fail To Hit Target,” 11/29/10

Faucon, Benoit and Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraqi Kurdish Oil Exports To Resume Within Days – Source,” Dow Jones, 2/1/11

Gibbs, Walter, “UPDATE 1-DNO boosts Iraq production, terms still not settled,” Reuters, 2/16/11

Hafidh, Hassan, “Impasse On Kurdish Exports Signals Broader Iraq Oil Uncertainty,” Dow Jones, 12/31/10
- “Iraq Kurdish June Oil Exports 175,000 B/D – Minister,” Dow Jones, 7/13/11
- “Iraq Kurds to Resolve Oil Issue,” Wall Street Journal, 9/13/12
- “Iraq’s Kurdish Oil Exports At 75,000 B/D – Official,” Dow Jones, 2/18/11
- “UPDATE: Iraq Plans To Export 2.75M B/D In 2012 Vs 2.2M B/D 2011-SOMO,” Dow Jones, 11/23/11

Holter, Mikael, “UPDATE 2-DNO says new Iraq govt to boost its oil export push,” Reuters, 11/11/10

Ketz, Sammy, “Iraq to respect Kurd profit-sharing oil deals: PM,” Agence France Presse, 2/5/11

Al-Khayat, Faleh, “Iraq’s oil exports reach 2.145 million b/d in December: SOMO,” Platts, 1/3/12

KRG, “KRG Oil Contractors to Get First Payment,” 5/5/11

Lawler, Alex, “Iraq Kurdistan oil export restart may be temporary,” Reuters, 8/2/12

Mackey, Peg, “Kurdish oil trade with Turkey rising, more to come,” Reuters, 9/9/12

Neuhof, Florian, “Charges in Kurdistan cause DNO to slide into the red,” The National, 8/23/12

Pfeifer, Sylvia and Blas, Javier, “Shell pulls out of Kurdistan oil talks,” Financial Times, 11/16/11

Rahman, Mohammed Abdul, “Erbil and Baghdad agree on reimbursing oil companies,” AK News, 9/15/12

Rasheed, Ahmed, “UPDATE 1-Iraq to pay expenses to oil firms in Kurdish region,” Reuters, 1/19/11
- “UPDATE 2-Iraqi Kurdistan to keep pumping oil to Sep. 15-sources,” Reuters, 9/1/12
- “UPDATE 2-Kurdistan warns Baghdad it will halt oil exports again,” Reuters, 8/28/12

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Oil companies active in Iraqi Kurdistan,” 1/5/11
- “Iraq’s Kurdistan restarts oil exports- source,” 8/7/12
- “Iraqi Kurdistan crude output at 115,000bpd,” 4/7/11
- “Kurdistan to keep Sept oil output in Baghdad deal,” 9/14/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq, Kurdistan end oil dispute, exports continue,” Reuters, 9/13/12

Smith, Grant, “Kurdistan Says Iraq Must Investigate Missing Crude Exports,” Bloomberg, 3/15/12

Al-Wannan, Jaafar, “Baghdad doubts Kurdistan’s ability to export 170,000 oil barrels per day,” AK News, 2/18/12
- “Erbil exports 75,000 barrels of oil illegally,” AK News, 12/17/11

Yeranian, Edward, “Iraq’s Kurdistan Region Halts Oil Exports to Baghdad,” Voice of America, 4/2/12