Tearing the region apart? the costs of iraqi kurdistan’s diplomacy
niqash | Roman Zagros | London | 06.12.2012
The two most important politicians in Iraqi Kurdistan have
different international allegiances: one to Iran and the other to Turkey. And
recently those allegiances have been causing trouble inside the mostly peaceful
region.
The allegiance of Iraqi Kurds’ most influential leaders, Jalal
Talabani and Massoud Barzani, to Iran and Turkey, is not a figment of the
political analyst’s imagination. It is real. And it could cost the Iraqi Ku2rds
dearly.
It is strong enough to have forced the former rivals to appear on
different sides of several important political arguments, mostly over matters
crucial to the two regional superpowers – that includes the Shiite coalition
ruling in Baghdad and the Kurdish question in Turkey, and now in Syria.
The parties of Iraqi President, Talabani, and the President of the
semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani, currently run the
Iraqi Kurdistan’s regional government in a coalition. These parties are,
respectively, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP).
But in reality, the semi-autonomous region is split between the two
and the areas that traditionally fell under their control are still dubbed the
“green” and “yellow” zones - after the colours of the parties’ flags – and they
informally maintain total command over the armed forces in each respective
zone.
But perhaps that kind of mistrust the two sides are demonstrating at
the moment is not all that surprising; the two parties were involved in bloody
infighting for a good part of the 1970s and 80s, and for four years in the
90s.
The past few months have seen the two parties publicly disagree on
several key issues, including the region's draft Constitution, their position on
Turkey and its Kurdish question, the central government and not least their own
2007 strategic agreement, which saw the two parties agree on the terms by which
they now rule Iraqi Kurdistan.
Before the Syrian conflict came to split the agendas of Iran and
Turkey so clearly apart, the former Iraqi Kurdish foes had managed to set their
difference aside and they have practically marched in lockstep over key issues
since signing the agreement.
But divergence of the two leaders’ path became especially apparent
when, earlier this year, Talabani refused to sign a motion of no-confidence
against Iraq’s current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which brought an effort
led by Barzani to unseat al-Maliki, to a grinding halt.
Considering Iraqi Kurdistan’s geostrategic and long-term economic
importance to Iran and Turkey, both of whom have a sizeable Kurdish population,
it is not farfetched to claim that unless there is a major strategic rethinking
by the Kurdish leaders, Iraqi Kurdistan will bear the brunt of this regional
polarization as their leaders are pulled apart along the lines of their
conflicting loyalties – this could result in a division so severe that it may
well compromise its territorial integrity.
Latest estimates put the size of Iraqi Kurdistan’s annual trade with
Turkey at US$8 billion to US$10 billion and, despite an international blockade,
at $8 billion with Iran. Barzani’s yellow zone facilitates Turkish trade and
Talabani’s green zone caters for Iranian trade.
Additionally Iraqi Kurdistan’s newly estimated 45 billion potential
barrels of oil sets it comfortably high up on the world’s energy map, a fact
that the neighbours and many Western oil majors have recognized and acted
upon.
Much of Iraqi Kurdistan’s success with the oil industry owes to
Barzani’s insistence on keeping Kurdish resources away from Baghdad’s
centralized bureaucracy – this has also brought him closer to Turkey but it’s
brought with it the risk of moving further away from his ally, Talabani. The
latter was not only not invited to play a part in the Turkish deals but also
placed in an awkward position in Baghdad where he has had to explain his ally’s
actions.
Meanwhile on the other side of the fence, Talabani has been on the
lookout for opportunities beyond the current alliance and beyond Iraqi Kurdistan
too. His party has reached out to Turkey’s Peace and Democracy Party (known as
BDP), an opposition party in the Turkish parliament that supports the Kurdistan
Workers' Party, or PKK, which has been fighting the Turkish government for more
rights and autonomy and which is considered by some a “terrorist
organisation”.
Earlier in October, days after Barzani returned from a conference
run by Turkey's ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, headed by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, where he had delivered a speech in favour of
Erdogan, a leading member of Talabani’s party told a Peace and Democracy Party
conference that Ankara cannot view the Kurds with “Ottoman eyes”.
Talabani’s party also recently signed a petition protesting Turkey's
dire human rights records. Rather tellingly, all the major Iraqi Kurdish
political parties and organizations signed the petition – apart from
Barzani’s.
Barzani further aligned himself with Turkey by endorsing the
Turkey-approved Syrian Kurdish National Council instead of an armed PKK offshoot
working in Syria. In Syria the PKK-associated movement has two wings, with the
political side known as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria and the
military wing named the Popular Protection Units (or YPG).
Barzani also arranged for a meeting between the Turkish foreign
minister and Council officials in Erbil, thus openly turning more of a cold
shoulder to the PKK.
And then Talabani turned his back on Barzani on yet another crucial
Kurdish matter: Iraqi Kurdistan’s draft Constitution.
Having pushed the charter through the Kurdistan parliament in 2009
as a political favour to Barzani, in late September, Talabani signed a
memorandum with another influential Kurdish player, one of his former allies,
Nawshirwan Mustafa, who currently heads Iraqi Kurdistan’s biggest opposition
party, the Change movement – the memo aimed to bring the draft Constitution back
to parliament for major surgery.
Mustafa commands a 23-seat opposition bloc in the 111-seat Kurdistan
Parliament – but before splitting from the party and forming an opposition
movement back in 2009, he served as Talabani’s deputy for decades. And
currently, Talabani and his former deputy have the numbers it takes to form a
government.
It is widely believed that Iran brokered the deal that
saw the two long-troubled former allies set aside their differences. Qasim
Soleimani, the commander of the Qods force, a special military unit of the
Iranian army that often works beyond the Iranian borders, visited Talabani’s
“green zone” in September, following a trip Mustafa made to Tehran back in
June.
Local press suggested that part of Soleimani’s message was to urge
the green zone’s allies, which also includes Mustafa, not to side with Syrian
rebels.
The Barzani-Talabani alliance of convenience - which was, in
essence, a means to end rivalry between the two and which culminated in a
finely-balanced power sharing deal – now seems to be crumbling under the sway of
their bigger neighbours. The proof: the two parties recently, and very publicly,
called for a full review of the strategic agreement to address complaints from
within.
Those complaints have mostly come from PUK hardliners, who have felt
more and more disillusioned with the pact that, in practice, left them trailing
behind the KDP.
Then again, many outside the two parties have also called for the
agreement to be abolished because it’s seen as paralyzing democracy and
rendering local elections meaningless – because as the two continue to share
power, neither is prepared to concede anything to the other.
But perhaps a politically stable Kurdistan led by a stable long-term
ruler is what Ankara is after. Ankara seems willing to back that horse, whether
it is at the expense of local democracy or not.
There is a lot at stake: By aligning
so heavily with Turkey, Barzani, is moving away from his former ally, Talabani
and the PUK and the Change Movement. And because it is unlikely for the two
green zone leaders to join Barzani’s cause, the two zones are increasingly being
torn apart.
Roman Zagros is a UK-based media analyst and former BBC editor. He also edits the website: insightkurdistan.com
