Oct 15 08 - First, it forces Iraq’s commercial farmers to use registered terminator seeds (the “protected variety”). Then it defines natural seeds as illegal (the “infringing variety”), in a classic Orwellian turn of language.
This is so incredible that it must be re-stated: the exotic genetically scrambled seeds are the “protected variety” and the indigenous seeds are the “infringing variety.”
As Jeffrey Smith explains, author of Order 81: Re-Engineering Iraqi Agriculture:
“To qualify for PVP [Plant Variety Protection], seeds have to meet the following criteria: they must be ‘new, distinct, uniform and stable’… it is impossible for the seeds developed by the people of Iraq to meet these criteria. Their seeds are not ‘new’ as they are the product of millennia of development. Nor are they ‘distinct’. The free exchange of seeds practiced for centuries ensures that characteristics are spread and shared across local varieties. And they are the opposite of ‘uniform’ and ’stable’ by the very nature of their biodiversity.” (3)
Order 81 comes with the Orwellian title of “Plant Variety Protection.” Any self-respecting scientist knows, however, that imposing biological standardization accomplishes the exact opposite: It reduces biodiversity and threatens species. So Order 81 comes with an Orwellian title and consists of Orwellian provisions.
Please see:
http://morris108.wordpress.com/2008/10/24/shareholders-ask-monsanto-to-defend-us-constitution-iraqi-farmers-legally-forced-to-use-monsanto-seeds-ex-director-advises-obama/
Saturday, 28 March 2009
Friday, 27 March 2009
A Sad New Record for Iraq
According to an UNHCR report, published March 24 2009, Iraqi refugees are heading the list of asylum applications worldwide for 2008: “For the third consecutive year, Iraq was the leading country of origin. The number of Iraqi claims is almost twice as high as those submitted by Somali asylum-seekers, the second most important source country. Other important source countries are the Russian Federation, Afghanistan, China, and Serbia.
Iraqis lodged some 40,500 new asylum claims during the year, or roughly every tenth application in the industrialized world. This figure is a 10 per cent decrease compared to 2007 (45,100 claims). The 2007 and 2008 levels are still below the ones witnessed between 2000 and 2002 when, on average, 50,000 Iraqis sought international protection in the industrialized world.” (http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/49c796572.pdf)
It proves that it is not an overstatement to say that the sanctions, the invasion and the occupation of Iraq constitute one of the largest humanitarian disasters of our time. And yet the press does not recognize it as such and world public opinion is unaware of it. And this in spite of the many shocking reports (like the recent Oxfam report on the situation of Women). One can consider this fact as nothing less than a form of collective negationism. We have to break the silence!
Lieven De Cauter
philosopher/writer
Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Kuleuven
Mediaschool Rits, Brussels
Berlage Institute, Rotterdam
BRussells Tribunal
www.brusselstribunal.org
Iraqis lodged some 40,500 new asylum claims during the year, or roughly every tenth application in the industrialized world. This figure is a 10 per cent decrease compared to 2007 (45,100 claims). The 2007 and 2008 levels are still below the ones witnessed between 2000 and 2002 when, on average, 50,000 Iraqis sought international protection in the industrialized world.” (http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/49c796572.pdf)
It proves that it is not an overstatement to say that the sanctions, the invasion and the occupation of Iraq constitute one of the largest humanitarian disasters of our time. And yet the press does not recognize it as such and world public opinion is unaware of it. And this in spite of the many shocking reports (like the recent Oxfam report on the situation of Women). One can consider this fact as nothing less than a form of collective negationism. We have to break the silence!
Lieven De Cauter
philosopher/writer
Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Kuleuven
Mediaschool Rits, Brussels
Berlage Institute, Rotterdam
BRussells Tribunal
www.brusselstribunal.org
Tuesday, 24 March 2009
Gül, Türkmen milletvekillerini kabul etti
Gül, Türkmen milletvekillerini kabul etti
24 Mart 2009, Salı
Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül, Irak ziyaretinin ikinci gününde başkent Bağdat'ta Iraklı Türkmen milletvekillerini kabul etti.
Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'e tahsis edilen Devlet Konuk Evi'nde yerel saatle 09.00'da başlayan görüşme sürüyor.
Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'ün kabul ettiği milletvekilleri arasında Irak Türkmen Cephesi Başkanı Saaddettin Ergeç, Şii İttifakından Abbas Beyatlı, Sadr grubundan Fevzi Ekrem ve Hüseyin Şerif ile bağımsız milletvekili İzzettin Devlet yer alıyor.
Can Turkey bring hope to the Iraqis?
Gul and Talabani Met in Baghdad: Can Turkey Bring Hope to the Iraqis?
An interview with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ihsan Bal, the director of the USAK Centre for International Security, Ethnic Studies and Terrorism, regarding Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visit to Iraq.
Q: What is the importance of Turkish President Abdullah Gul's Visit to Iraq?
Bal: Turkish President Abdullah Gul's two-day visit to Iraq has great importance for four reasons. First of all, Turkey's probable contribution to the development of Iraq is very essential. Iraq has been in an uncertain and instable period for many years, and the attempt to establish a democracy needs serious assistance/contribution from outsiders.
There are many problems that need to be solved: the instability in the region since 2003, the lack of military foundations to provide security in Iraq, state organizations' inability to work efficiently, and some resistance movements' use of Iraq as battleground and training field. Turkey has solutions for these questions. Turkey is visiting Iraq as a regional power who could make a huge contribution to Iraq and find constructive solutions for its problems.
While in Iraq, Turkey has an agenda for the investments of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation & Development Agency), promoting Iraq's natural resources to the world market, and re-strengthening Iraq's economy. Building trust between the two countries and removing suspicion, especially with the Iraqi Kurds, promotes Turkey and presents it as model country for Iraq's reconstruction and democratization.
The ongoing negotiations between Iraq and Turkey addressed Turkey as the only country with which all parties/groups in Iraq could cooperate to reach a common point by bringing the Kurdish population into the existing peace between the Arabs and Turkmens.
Therefore, Turkey is warmly welcomed by Iraq
Q: What about the security issues and agreements between the two countries?
Bal: Besides all these negotiations and warm welcomes, there are definitely proposals regarding the security issues. There are especially two important things that Turkey wants to realize. The first one is to sign joint security cooperation agreements with Iraq and the second one is that Turkey would train the Iraqi security forces if needed.
The Turkish Minister of the Interior is attending this visit with President Gul. This shows the seriousness of Turkey and makes the previous security proposals more visible and tangible. Another important point is that the parties are going to make an agreement which will benefit everyone, not damage them. In this process, nobody will lose. Iraqi President Talabani and Turkish President Gul have said similar things during the 5th World Water Forum: "If we all use our minds, there is a chance for everybody to win and we can build a peaceful future."
Q: Is it possible to make economic agreements as well during the visit?
Bal: President Gul was also accompanied by the state minister responsible for exports. This is important for the region, because the agreements will help Iraq to market their natural gas and oil to the world. The visit also aims to support the Iraqi entrepreneurs/investors and provide the basic necessary items and goods for the development of Iraq. Turkey, as an ally of the US, is an important regional power that could support the region's global integration. From this perspective, Turkey is important for the Iraqi people, who were crushed during the Saddam era and experienced major trauma in the occupation period, in terms of the construction of psychological will and the help that they need to save them from the mental trauma based on long and severe experiences, rather than the financial help that they need for establishment of Iraq's future.
It is obvious that Turkey could give Iraq much more than it requests in return. Turkey's most important gain would be a democratic and wealthy neighboring Iraq that could solve its problems and secure itself.
Iraq, which has reached a specific level of development in the southeastern region, has an increasing level of belief in democracy and law day-by-day, and could use its wealth of gas and oil in this framework, has a great importance for Turkey in terms of Turkey's border security, the liquidation of the PKK terrorist organization, a more peaceful environment with the Kurds, avoidance of radical movements based in Iraq, and the solution of the Kirkuk issue. Turkish President Gul's two-day visit to Iraq will contribute to all these problems and is important in terms of the region's security, peace, and stability.
Edited by Kaitlin MacKenzie
www.usak.org.trwww.turkishweekly.netwww.usakgundem.com
An interview with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ihsan Bal, the director of the USAK Centre for International Security, Ethnic Studies and Terrorism, regarding Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visit to Iraq.
Q: What is the importance of Turkish President Abdullah Gul's Visit to Iraq?
Bal: Turkish President Abdullah Gul's two-day visit to Iraq has great importance for four reasons. First of all, Turkey's probable contribution to the development of Iraq is very essential. Iraq has been in an uncertain and instable period for many years, and the attempt to establish a democracy needs serious assistance/contribution from outsiders.
There are many problems that need to be solved: the instability in the region since 2003, the lack of military foundations to provide security in Iraq, state organizations' inability to work efficiently, and some resistance movements' use of Iraq as battleground and training field. Turkey has solutions for these questions. Turkey is visiting Iraq as a regional power who could make a huge contribution to Iraq and find constructive solutions for its problems.
While in Iraq, Turkey has an agenda for the investments of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation & Development Agency), promoting Iraq's natural resources to the world market, and re-strengthening Iraq's economy. Building trust between the two countries and removing suspicion, especially with the Iraqi Kurds, promotes Turkey and presents it as model country for Iraq's reconstruction and democratization.
The ongoing negotiations between Iraq and Turkey addressed Turkey as the only country with which all parties/groups in Iraq could cooperate to reach a common point by bringing the Kurdish population into the existing peace between the Arabs and Turkmens.
Therefore, Turkey is warmly welcomed by Iraq
Q: What about the security issues and agreements between the two countries?
Bal: Besides all these negotiations and warm welcomes, there are definitely proposals regarding the security issues. There are especially two important things that Turkey wants to realize. The first one is to sign joint security cooperation agreements with Iraq and the second one is that Turkey would train the Iraqi security forces if needed.
The Turkish Minister of the Interior is attending this visit with President Gul. This shows the seriousness of Turkey and makes the previous security proposals more visible and tangible. Another important point is that the parties are going to make an agreement which will benefit everyone, not damage them. In this process, nobody will lose. Iraqi President Talabani and Turkish President Gul have said similar things during the 5th World Water Forum: "If we all use our minds, there is a chance for everybody to win and we can build a peaceful future."
Q: Is it possible to make economic agreements as well during the visit?
Bal: President Gul was also accompanied by the state minister responsible for exports. This is important for the region, because the agreements will help Iraq to market their natural gas and oil to the world. The visit also aims to support the Iraqi entrepreneurs/investors and provide the basic necessary items and goods for the development of Iraq. Turkey, as an ally of the US, is an important regional power that could support the region's global integration. From this perspective, Turkey is important for the Iraqi people, who were crushed during the Saddam era and experienced major trauma in the occupation period, in terms of the construction of psychological will and the help that they need to save them from the mental trauma based on long and severe experiences, rather than the financial help that they need for establishment of Iraq's future.
It is obvious that Turkey could give Iraq much more than it requests in return. Turkey's most important gain would be a democratic and wealthy neighboring Iraq that could solve its problems and secure itself.
Iraq, which has reached a specific level of development in the southeastern region, has an increasing level of belief in democracy and law day-by-day, and could use its wealth of gas and oil in this framework, has a great importance for Turkey in terms of Turkey's border security, the liquidation of the PKK terrorist organization, a more peaceful environment with the Kurds, avoidance of radical movements based in Iraq, and the solution of the Kirkuk issue. Turkish President Gul's two-day visit to Iraq will contribute to all these problems and is important in terms of the region's security, peace, and stability.
Edited by Kaitlin MacKenzie
www.usak.org.trwww.turkishweekly.netwww.usakgundem.com
KERKÜK’ süz IRAK ziyareti….!?
KERKÜK’ süz IRAK ziyareti….!?
Uzun zamandır beklenen ziyaret nihayet geçekleşiyor..!
Otuz yılı aşkın bir süredir ilk defa Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhur Başkanı Irak’ ı ziyaret ediyor.
Öğrendiğim kadarıyla programda Kerkük ziyareti yok.
Çocukluğumu hatırlıyorum, Türk Devlet büyükleri her Irak ziyaretlerinde mutlaka Kerkük’ e uğralardı…
Türkiye’ den, Anadolu’dan selam getirirlerdi ve bizler de o manevi destekle o ruhla yıllarca yaşardık .. taa ki yeni bir selam gelinceye kadar.! Ayakta durduk, durabildik hem de dimdik.. selamdan selama…
Kerkük, Irak Türklerinin kalbidir..neden ne olursa olsun (bahane üretmek çok, yanlış akıl ve yol gösterenlerde çok ) bu yüce Türkmen şehri ziyaret edilmeliydi.
Oradaki soydaşlarımıza paha biçilmez muhteşem bir armağan olurdu. Her zamanki gibi yine pırlanta bir fırsatı yanlış hesaplar ve bilgiler yüzünden kaçırdık.
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Devleti Gazza‘ da gösterdiği hassasiyetin çok azını bile maalesef Irak Türkleri için gösteremiyor, göstermiyor.
Sizleri bilmiyorum, ama benim yüreğim acıdı…sızlıyor….sızlıyoooor….!!
Atasözü ( Türkmence ) : ( ayag nece varsın gevil getmiyen yere = ayak nasıl gider gönül gitmeyen yere…!? )
Dr. Ferid Müftü
23. Mart. 2009
Uzun zamandır beklenen ziyaret nihayet geçekleşiyor..!
Otuz yılı aşkın bir süredir ilk defa Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhur Başkanı Irak’ ı ziyaret ediyor.
Öğrendiğim kadarıyla programda Kerkük ziyareti yok.
Çocukluğumu hatırlıyorum, Türk Devlet büyükleri her Irak ziyaretlerinde mutlaka Kerkük’ e uğralardı…
Türkiye’ den, Anadolu’dan selam getirirlerdi ve bizler de o manevi destekle o ruhla yıllarca yaşardık .. taa ki yeni bir selam gelinceye kadar.! Ayakta durduk, durabildik hem de dimdik.. selamdan selama…
Kerkük, Irak Türklerinin kalbidir..neden ne olursa olsun (bahane üretmek çok, yanlış akıl ve yol gösterenlerde çok ) bu yüce Türkmen şehri ziyaret edilmeliydi.
Oradaki soydaşlarımıza paha biçilmez muhteşem bir armağan olurdu. Her zamanki gibi yine pırlanta bir fırsatı yanlış hesaplar ve bilgiler yüzünden kaçırdık.
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Devleti Gazza‘ da gösterdiği hassasiyetin çok azını bile maalesef Irak Türkleri için gösteremiyor, göstermiyor.
Sizleri bilmiyorum, ama benim yüreğim acıdı…sızlıyor….sızlıyoooor….!!
Atasözü ( Türkmence ) : ( ayag nece varsın gevil getmiyen yere = ayak nasıl gider gönül gitmeyen yere…!? )
Dr. Ferid Müftü
23. Mart. 2009
Sunday, 22 March 2009
IRAQ - A Forgotten Humanitarian Disaster
A Forgotten Humanitarian Disaster
By Lieven De Cauter
By Lieven De Cauter
March 20, 2009 "BRussells Tribunal " --- The sixth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq is a sad occasion for the balance sheet: during six years of occupation 1.2 million citizens were killed, 2,000 doctors killed, and 5,500 academics and intellectuals assassinated or imprisoned. There are 4.7 million refugees: 2.7 million inside the country and two million have fled to neighbouring countries, among which are 20,000 medical doctors. According to the Red Cross, Iraq is now a country of widows and orphans: two million widows as a consequence of war, embargo, war again and occupation, and five million orphans, many of whom are homeless (estimated at 500,000).
Almost a third of Iraq’s children suffer from malnutrition. Some 70 per cent of Iraqi girls no longer go to school. Medical services, not so long ago the best in the region, have totally collapsed: 75 per cent of medical staff have left their jobs, half of them have fled the country, and after six years of “reconstruction” health services in Iraq still do not meet minimum standards.
Because of the use of depleted uranium in ammunition by the occupation, the number of cancer cases and miscarriages has drastically increased. According to a recent Oxfam report, the situation of women is most worrisome. The study states that in spite of optimistic bulletins in the press, the situation of women keeps deteriorating. The most elementary supplies are still not available. Access to drinkable water is for large parts of the population a problem and electricity is functioning only three to six hours a day, and this in a state that was once a nation of engineers.
More than four in 10 Iraqis live under the poverty threshold and unemployment is immense (28.1 per cent of the active population). Besides 26 official prisons, there a some 600 secret prisons. According to the Iraqi Union of Political Prisoners, over 400,000 Iraqis have suffered detention since 2003, among which 6,500 minors and 10,000 women. Torture is practiced on a large scale, and some 87 per cent of detainees remain uncharged.
Corruption is immense: according to Transparency International, Iraq, after Somalia and Myanmar, is the most corrupt country in the world. The American Foreign Affairs journal calls Iraq “a failed state”. This is symbolised by the fact that Iraq, a state that has the third largest oil reserves in the world, must import refined oil on a massive scale. Authorities are on the verge of giving oil concessions for 25 years to international (also European) oil companies, though they have no mandate or legal authority to do so. Instead of being paid reparations for the enormous destruction wrought on the infrastructure of the country, entailing billions in oil revenues lost, Iraq is again in line to be robbed.
There is large scale ethnic cleansing going on against the Turkmen, the Christians, the Assyrians and the Shebak. Kirkuk is being “Kurdicised” by massive immigration and illegal settlements (of Israeli inspiration) and its history falsified.
This data, referenced in numerous reports, was presented during an information session in the European Parliament organised by the BRussells Tribunal on 18 March by a panel of Iraqi specialists. On 19 March, there was a session in the Belgian Parliament where a national representative after the statement of Dr Omar Al-Kubaissi, a renowned Iraqi cardiologist and expert on health, frankly admitted that he had no idea of the scale of the humanitarian disaster. Who can blame him? In the European press we hear little or nothing concerning this humanitarian disaster. In the newspapers there is talk of elections, of an occasional bomb attack, of the political process, of the positive results of the “surge”, etc, but concerning the suffering the Iraqi people … next to nothing. We have fallen asleep and we console ourselves: Obama plans the retreat American troops; therefore the issue of Iraq is off the agenda. The truth is that we want to forget this humanitarian disaster, because the West is responsible. Of course, in the first and last instance the administrations of Bush and Blair, but also the Netherlands, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Italy were part of the coalition and hence accessory while Antwerp was a vital transit port for the invasion. Therefore also Europe bears a heavy responsibility. How is it possible that we can dissimulate the impact of the war, which initially stirred world public opinion, in spite of the flow of shocking reports? “Darfur” sounds a bell meanwhile (and correctly so) as a sort of African holocaust, but the crimes against the humanity of a near “genocidal” scale in Iraq are swept under the carpet. If the press does not do its job, how can public opinion be touched? Even activists and well meaning politicians are not on the level. This type of disinformation, and the indifference that comes with it, one could call a form of negationism, or at least a type of immoral ignorance. Wir haben es nicht gewusst, we will say. But the people of the Arab region will not forgive us. Let this be clear.
Lieven De Cauter
philosopher, initiator of the BRussells Tribunal
20 March 2009
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OPINION: Post-Sectarian Strategies for Iraq, by Reidar Visser
Post-Sectarian Strategies for Iraq
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
18 March 2009
It is becoming increasingly unfashionable to think long and hard about Iraq. In Washington, a great intellectual trek from Iraq to Afghanistan is already well underway. Despite the increasing similarity between Obama policy on Iraq and priorities defined by the Pentagon in the latter part of the Bush presidency, critical Democratic voices on Iraq policy are gradually becoming something of a rarity, with growing support for a narrative to the effect that “the peaceful conduct of the January 2009 local elections represented a transformation of the military gains during ‘the surge’ to political gains in the shape of a more mature form of politics in Iraq.” In the capital of other countries of the world, including many Arab states, there are increasing signs of willingness to accept the Iraqi transformation process as something that is now more or less complete.
But if the fundament – the 2005 constitution Iraqi political more generally – is in itself unsecure and disputed, is it really such an excellent idea to focus only on the surface of Iraqi politics and to ignore the deeper questions? Is it a sound strategy to reduce national reconciliation issues to the question of Kirkuk, where a “grand bargain” logic would simply mean the perfection of the bazaar-style carve-up of Iraq seen since 2003, and not its much-needed antidote? Is it wise to call for a “regional role” for Iran at a time when many Shiites in Iraq, Iran and elsewhere consider this to be nothing but a cave-in to a particular Khomeinist current that has sought to dominate Shiism globally since the late 1970s even though it is still rejected by many members of its targeted constituencies across the Middle East, including in Iran and Iraq?
Two recent reports on Iraq policy issues address these and other questions. The first one, More than “Shiites” and “Sunnis”: How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq (available as PDF) has been prepared by a group of prominent Iraqi academics and professionals in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and explains how institutional reform and constitutional revision are the keys that can guard Iraq against many of the threats that historically have been at the forefront of the minds of Western policy-makers – including excessive Iranian political interference, the dangers of a relapse into authoritarianism, and/or renewed attempts by jihadist groups to turn Iraq into a sectarian battlefield and a central front against the West.
The Iraqi group singles out the December 2009 parliamentary elections as the most promising vehicle for bringing political change to Iraq, and asks for the support of the international community so that these elections can be not only free and fair but also generate a serious debate about the basic framework of Iraq’s political system itself.
The report facilitated by NUPI concludes with 18 specific recommendations as to how the outside world can regain leverage in Iraq while at the same time aligning itself with broad national and “post-sectarian” Iraqi agendas rather than sectarian ones. Among the key proposals are the following:
• The United States should officially acknowledge that, between 2003 and 2008, US strategy in Iraq has not always been sufficiently appreciative of the desire of the majority of Iraqis to live as one nation, and at times has directly been at odds with the vision of a unified state. President Barack Obama’s emphasis on Iraqi national unity in his recent policy speech was a step in the right direction, but more of this is needed so that those Iraqis currently on the sidelines of politics can feel that even if Washington does not want to interfere in the constitutional process anymore, the US at the very least would not try to prevent them from working for a non-sectarian Iraq (as some conspiracy theories have it). Simply refraining from uncritically reproducing sectarian categories in policy declarations on Iraq would send a positive signal; an official statement to the effect that the United States is looking forward to the day when merit alone should determine the identity of Iraq’s top political leaders would be even better, and would resonate with important forces in Iraq that still feel alienated in a system where an ethno-sectarian logic continues to prevail in many arenas.
• While “unconditional engagement” by the Arab states with the new Iraq to some extent may serve as a counterweight against Iranian influences, it seems unwise that the entire Arab world should give up all its leverage at once. Thus, at least some Arab states should try to keep Iraqi constitutional issues on the agenda by linking debt cancellations and full restoration of normal relations to progress in the constitutional revision process in whatever direction the next Iraqi parliament wants to take it. Again, a promise of reform – or simply making it legitimate to talk about reform – could be sufficient to induce broader participation in the 2009 parliamentary elections. This would appeal to and galvanize both the vast masses of voters whose ballots in the last local elections were “wasted” (in the sense that they did not elect any representatives), as well as important segments of the resistance that are currently on the sidelines (who would be more responsive to carrots framed in “Iraqi” rather than in “Sunni” terms). The degree of leverage that actually exists at this level was revealed quite spectacularly in recent meetings between Iraqis and the Secretary-Genera of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, as both Sadrists and Daawa elements (in this case Ibrahim al-Jaafari) indicated an interest for an Arab League role (in facilitating national reconciliation or achieving debt relief respectively).
• President Obama is also on the right track with his focus on refugee return, but the US government could improve its chances of success if a deliberate attempt were made to talk about the Iraqi exiles as a great resource and an asset to the future government of the country rather than only as a problem. In other words, they are much more than “a challenge to the stability of the region” – a phrase that occurred in Obama’s policy speech at Camp Lejeune in February.
• To open negotiations with Iran about everything except Iraq (which would not be up for negotiation) would send a reassuring signal to many Iraqis, the Arab world at large, as well as Iranian oppositionists and reformists. Not only is fear of horse-trading about Iraq between Washington and Tehran the most recurrent nightmare scenario among Iraqis who are critical of the post-2003 political process. Many reformist Iranians, too – and Shiites critical of Khomeinism generally – would welcome an end to the idea of an “active regional role” for Iran. That sort of role would only give hardliners an excuse for disregarding reform at home, whereas US willingness to negotiate on nuclear energy and resumption of bilateral diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States would resonate with Iranian demands in areas where the regime in Tehran appears to enjoy more widespread popular backing for its positions.
• The group of Iraqis agrees that some kind of grand settlement on Kurdistan issues would have a beneficial effect on the atmosphere of Iraqi politics more generally (hence, the report is not titled More than "Shiites" and "Sunnis" and "Kurds"), but strongly recommends a search for a solution that would bring closure rather than create domino effects. This is why the group has not embraced the International Crisis Group proposal of “oil for soil” (which would create a federal region of Kirkuk) or UNAMI’s piecemeal demarcation project (which adopts an ethnic logic that could ultimately tear Kirkuk apart and open ever more “disputed territories” dossiers). Instead, it has proposed that international recognition of the autonomy of the three current Kurdistan governorates could provide unique depth to the Kurdish autonomy while at the same time allaying the fears of the neighbours (this proposal is inspired by ideas previously put forward by Liam Anderson), whereas a 10-year transitory regime for Kirkuk could provide the breathing space needed to move away from the destructive Balkans logic that currently prevails.
Another policy paper, Iran’s Role in Post-Occupation Iraq: Enemy, Good Neighbor or Overlord? (by Reidar Visser and published by The Century Foundation, available as PDF) shares some of these perspectives, and adds some discussion of the relationships between Iran and the various Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq after a year which US policy-makers often portray as a bad one for Tehran as far as the Iraq situation is concerned. Here are some of the main findings:
• While the common notion of Iraqi Shiites as Iraqi nationalists appears to be true with regard to the Shiite population of the country as a whole, it is not historically correct with respect to the pro-Iranian exiled Shiite Islamists that were installed as leaders of Iraq by the United States since 2003, such as ISCI and at least some of the Daawa factions.
• The irreducible minimum of Iranian desiderata in Iraq appears to be the maintenance of a system in which politics remains defined on the basis of sectarian identity, regardless of state structure more generally. Thus, whilst Tehran may be only experimenting as far as territorial partition in the shape of federalism is concerned (confer the increasingly ambiguous position of ISCI), psychological partition in the shape of ethno-sectarian quotas and power-sharing seems to be a more permanent goal. For this reason alone, a post-sectarian agenda seems the most promising avenue for a counter-strategy against excessive Iranian influence in Iraq.
• Accordingly, the reconstitution of the United Iraqi Alliance – possibly dressed up as a “national” and more centralist alliance under the leadership of the Daawa and the Sadrists but still a clearly Shiite Islamist project – could be a natural priority for Tehran when faced with ISCI’s declining popularity.
• Whilst Nuri al-Maliki has taken a number of valuable steps towards emphasising the virtues of a functioning centralised state (rather than abstract project of new federal regions), as well as professionalism as the number one criterion for recruitment to high-level jobs, only institutional change and constitutional revision can consolidate these positive tendencies in a way that would make Iraq more corrosive against external influences. Today, the Washington narrative of Maliki as an Iraqi nationalist and even secularist with widespread popular appeal remains problematic in many ways – including the continued importance of some pro-Iranian elements within his electoral coalition, his poor performance in Sunni areas north of Baghdad in the recent local elections, as well as renewed flirtation even inside his own Daawa branch with policies that can only benefit Iran in the long run (like pursuing a sectarian logic in the appointment of the next parliamentary speaker, or working to reconstitute a broader Shiite sectarian alliance).
• The United States seems to underestimate the scenario that a future pro-Iranian Iraqi regime may elect to (or feel pressured to) speak a perfectly Iraqi nationalist language on issues such as complete withdrawal of foreign troops (including “advisers” etc.) while at the same time coordinating pragmatically with Tehran for the long term. By way of example, for decades, Syria’s government has been impeccable in its ideological attachment to Arab nationalism but without jeopardising its long-standing ties to Iran.
Perhaps what many Iraqis now want from the outside world is most of all that these issues that relate to Iraq’s political system are allowed to remain on the agenda and are not swept under the carpet in uncritical jubilation for the drop in violence (and the new attention to Afghanistan). They continue to feel that the current system is biased against them, and that only systemic change can produce a level playing field. It may be tempting for the outside world to try to polish the facades in Iraq and then move on as if everything is normal, but that kind of approach also involves turning a blind eye to more profound issues that may well continue to haunt the region for decades unless they receive proper attention.
While American policy-makers are increasingly reluctant to have a wide-ranging debate on these questions, the Iraqis themselves continue to speak with a clear voice: for the sixth consecutive time since 2004, a majority of respondents in the ABC/BBC poll of Iraqis recently produced an overwhelming majority (this time 70%) in favour of a centralised state structure, hence effectively rejecting aspects of the 2005 constitution. While the federalism question in the poll is awkwardly framed (among other thing it does not do justice to the potential for asymmetrical federalism in the constitution), the result nonetheless speaks for itself: It shows the need for the international community to continue to ask tough questions about Iraq and its post-2003 system of government.
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
18 March 2009
It is becoming increasingly unfashionable to think long and hard about Iraq. In Washington, a great intellectual trek from Iraq to Afghanistan is already well underway. Despite the increasing similarity between Obama policy on Iraq and priorities defined by the Pentagon in the latter part of the Bush presidency, critical Democratic voices on Iraq policy are gradually becoming something of a rarity, with growing support for a narrative to the effect that “the peaceful conduct of the January 2009 local elections represented a transformation of the military gains during ‘the surge’ to political gains in the shape of a more mature form of politics in Iraq.” In the capital of other countries of the world, including many Arab states, there are increasing signs of willingness to accept the Iraqi transformation process as something that is now more or less complete.
But if the fundament – the 2005 constitution Iraqi political more generally – is in itself unsecure and disputed, is it really such an excellent idea to focus only on the surface of Iraqi politics and to ignore the deeper questions? Is it a sound strategy to reduce national reconciliation issues to the question of Kirkuk, where a “grand bargain” logic would simply mean the perfection of the bazaar-style carve-up of Iraq seen since 2003, and not its much-needed antidote? Is it wise to call for a “regional role” for Iran at a time when many Shiites in Iraq, Iran and elsewhere consider this to be nothing but a cave-in to a particular Khomeinist current that has sought to dominate Shiism globally since the late 1970s even though it is still rejected by many members of its targeted constituencies across the Middle East, including in Iran and Iraq?
Two recent reports on Iraq policy issues address these and other questions. The first one, More than “Shiites” and “Sunnis”: How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq (available as PDF) has been prepared by a group of prominent Iraqi academics and professionals in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and explains how institutional reform and constitutional revision are the keys that can guard Iraq against many of the threats that historically have been at the forefront of the minds of Western policy-makers – including excessive Iranian political interference, the dangers of a relapse into authoritarianism, and/or renewed attempts by jihadist groups to turn Iraq into a sectarian battlefield and a central front against the West.
The Iraqi group singles out the December 2009 parliamentary elections as the most promising vehicle for bringing political change to Iraq, and asks for the support of the international community so that these elections can be not only free and fair but also generate a serious debate about the basic framework of Iraq’s political system itself.
The report facilitated by NUPI concludes with 18 specific recommendations as to how the outside world can regain leverage in Iraq while at the same time aligning itself with broad national and “post-sectarian” Iraqi agendas rather than sectarian ones. Among the key proposals are the following:
• The United States should officially acknowledge that, between 2003 and 2008, US strategy in Iraq has not always been sufficiently appreciative of the desire of the majority of Iraqis to live as one nation, and at times has directly been at odds with the vision of a unified state. President Barack Obama’s emphasis on Iraqi national unity in his recent policy speech was a step in the right direction, but more of this is needed so that those Iraqis currently on the sidelines of politics can feel that even if Washington does not want to interfere in the constitutional process anymore, the US at the very least would not try to prevent them from working for a non-sectarian Iraq (as some conspiracy theories have it). Simply refraining from uncritically reproducing sectarian categories in policy declarations on Iraq would send a positive signal; an official statement to the effect that the United States is looking forward to the day when merit alone should determine the identity of Iraq’s top political leaders would be even better, and would resonate with important forces in Iraq that still feel alienated in a system where an ethno-sectarian logic continues to prevail in many arenas.
• While “unconditional engagement” by the Arab states with the new Iraq to some extent may serve as a counterweight against Iranian influences, it seems unwise that the entire Arab world should give up all its leverage at once. Thus, at least some Arab states should try to keep Iraqi constitutional issues on the agenda by linking debt cancellations and full restoration of normal relations to progress in the constitutional revision process in whatever direction the next Iraqi parliament wants to take it. Again, a promise of reform – or simply making it legitimate to talk about reform – could be sufficient to induce broader participation in the 2009 parliamentary elections. This would appeal to and galvanize both the vast masses of voters whose ballots in the last local elections were “wasted” (in the sense that they did not elect any representatives), as well as important segments of the resistance that are currently on the sidelines (who would be more responsive to carrots framed in “Iraqi” rather than in “Sunni” terms). The degree of leverage that actually exists at this level was revealed quite spectacularly in recent meetings between Iraqis and the Secretary-Genera of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, as both Sadrists and Daawa elements (in this case Ibrahim al-Jaafari) indicated an interest for an Arab League role (in facilitating national reconciliation or achieving debt relief respectively).
• President Obama is also on the right track with his focus on refugee return, but the US government could improve its chances of success if a deliberate attempt were made to talk about the Iraqi exiles as a great resource and an asset to the future government of the country rather than only as a problem. In other words, they are much more than “a challenge to the stability of the region” – a phrase that occurred in Obama’s policy speech at Camp Lejeune in February.
• To open negotiations with Iran about everything except Iraq (which would not be up for negotiation) would send a reassuring signal to many Iraqis, the Arab world at large, as well as Iranian oppositionists and reformists. Not only is fear of horse-trading about Iraq between Washington and Tehran the most recurrent nightmare scenario among Iraqis who are critical of the post-2003 political process. Many reformist Iranians, too – and Shiites critical of Khomeinism generally – would welcome an end to the idea of an “active regional role” for Iran. That sort of role would only give hardliners an excuse for disregarding reform at home, whereas US willingness to negotiate on nuclear energy and resumption of bilateral diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States would resonate with Iranian demands in areas where the regime in Tehran appears to enjoy more widespread popular backing for its positions.
• The group of Iraqis agrees that some kind of grand settlement on Kurdistan issues would have a beneficial effect on the atmosphere of Iraqi politics more generally (hence, the report is not titled More than "Shiites" and "Sunnis" and "Kurds"), but strongly recommends a search for a solution that would bring closure rather than create domino effects. This is why the group has not embraced the International Crisis Group proposal of “oil for soil” (which would create a federal region of Kirkuk) or UNAMI’s piecemeal demarcation project (which adopts an ethnic logic that could ultimately tear Kirkuk apart and open ever more “disputed territories” dossiers). Instead, it has proposed that international recognition of the autonomy of the three current Kurdistan governorates could provide unique depth to the Kurdish autonomy while at the same time allaying the fears of the neighbours (this proposal is inspired by ideas previously put forward by Liam Anderson), whereas a 10-year transitory regime for Kirkuk could provide the breathing space needed to move away from the destructive Balkans logic that currently prevails.
Another policy paper, Iran’s Role in Post-Occupation Iraq: Enemy, Good Neighbor or Overlord? (by Reidar Visser and published by The Century Foundation, available as PDF) shares some of these perspectives, and adds some discussion of the relationships between Iran and the various Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq after a year which US policy-makers often portray as a bad one for Tehran as far as the Iraq situation is concerned. Here are some of the main findings:
• While the common notion of Iraqi Shiites as Iraqi nationalists appears to be true with regard to the Shiite population of the country as a whole, it is not historically correct with respect to the pro-Iranian exiled Shiite Islamists that were installed as leaders of Iraq by the United States since 2003, such as ISCI and at least some of the Daawa factions.
• The irreducible minimum of Iranian desiderata in Iraq appears to be the maintenance of a system in which politics remains defined on the basis of sectarian identity, regardless of state structure more generally. Thus, whilst Tehran may be only experimenting as far as territorial partition in the shape of federalism is concerned (confer the increasingly ambiguous position of ISCI), psychological partition in the shape of ethno-sectarian quotas and power-sharing seems to be a more permanent goal. For this reason alone, a post-sectarian agenda seems the most promising avenue for a counter-strategy against excessive Iranian influence in Iraq.
• Accordingly, the reconstitution of the United Iraqi Alliance – possibly dressed up as a “national” and more centralist alliance under the leadership of the Daawa and the Sadrists but still a clearly Shiite Islamist project – could be a natural priority for Tehran when faced with ISCI’s declining popularity.
• Whilst Nuri al-Maliki has taken a number of valuable steps towards emphasising the virtues of a functioning centralised state (rather than abstract project of new federal regions), as well as professionalism as the number one criterion for recruitment to high-level jobs, only institutional change and constitutional revision can consolidate these positive tendencies in a way that would make Iraq more corrosive against external influences. Today, the Washington narrative of Maliki as an Iraqi nationalist and even secularist with widespread popular appeal remains problematic in many ways – including the continued importance of some pro-Iranian elements within his electoral coalition, his poor performance in Sunni areas north of Baghdad in the recent local elections, as well as renewed flirtation even inside his own Daawa branch with policies that can only benefit Iran in the long run (like pursuing a sectarian logic in the appointment of the next parliamentary speaker, or working to reconstitute a broader Shiite sectarian alliance).
• The United States seems to underestimate the scenario that a future pro-Iranian Iraqi regime may elect to (or feel pressured to) speak a perfectly Iraqi nationalist language on issues such as complete withdrawal of foreign troops (including “advisers” etc.) while at the same time coordinating pragmatically with Tehran for the long term. By way of example, for decades, Syria’s government has been impeccable in its ideological attachment to Arab nationalism but without jeopardising its long-standing ties to Iran.
Perhaps what many Iraqis now want from the outside world is most of all that these issues that relate to Iraq’s political system are allowed to remain on the agenda and are not swept under the carpet in uncritical jubilation for the drop in violence (and the new attention to Afghanistan). They continue to feel that the current system is biased against them, and that only systemic change can produce a level playing field. It may be tempting for the outside world to try to polish the facades in Iraq and then move on as if everything is normal, but that kind of approach also involves turning a blind eye to more profound issues that may well continue to haunt the region for decades unless they receive proper attention.
While American policy-makers are increasingly reluctant to have a wide-ranging debate on these questions, the Iraqis themselves continue to speak with a clear voice: for the sixth consecutive time since 2004, a majority of respondents in the ABC/BBC poll of Iraqis recently produced an overwhelming majority (this time 70%) in favour of a centralised state structure, hence effectively rejecting aspects of the 2005 constitution. While the federalism question in the poll is awkwardly framed (among other thing it does not do justice to the potential for asymmetrical federalism in the constitution), the result nonetheless speaks for itself: It shows the need for the international community to continue to ask tough questions about Iraq and its post-2003 system of government.
Irak Anayasası ve Türkmenler
Irak Anayasası ve Türkmenler
Dr.İsmet A. Bekir
1925 ila 1970 yılları arasında kalan dönem içerisinde beş anayasa hazırlanmış ve yürürlüğü konulmuştur. Bunlar; Irak Kanun-i Esasisi (1925 Yılı Krallık Anayasası), 1958 Yılı Irak Geçici Anayasası, 1964, 1968 ve 1970 yıllarına ait anayasalardır. Bunların yanında 1990 yılında da bir anayasa projesi hazırlanmıştır. Ancak bu anayasaların hiç biri, Türkmenlerin, Irak’taki varlığına ve haklarına değinmemiştir. Sadece 1970 Anayasası, Irak toprak birliği kapsamında bütün azınlıkların meşru haklarını tanıyan bir hüküm içermiştir. Söz konusu hüküm, 1990 yılı anayasa projesinde de yer alıyordu. 1970 Anayasası ve 1990 yılına ait Anayasa projesi sadece bu hükme yer vermekle yetinip “azınlık” ve “meşru haklar” kavramının açıklamasını içermemiştir. (Meşru haklardan bahsederken acaba gayri meşru haklar da mı vardı?). Bütün bu anlatılanların yanına, Irak Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluşundan beri Türkmenlere uygulanan mezalim ve haksızlıkları da ekleyebiliriz. Yıllar geçtikçe ve yöneticiler değiştikçe, bu baskıcı ve zalimce uygulamalar da artmıştır ve 09 Nisan 2003 tarihinde dikta rejimin sona ermesine kadar devam etmiştir. 8 Temmuz 2004 tarihinde yayımlanan Irak Geçiş Dönemi Yönetimi Kanunu, Türkmenlerin varlık ve haklarını tanıyan, yönetim, siyasi ve kültürel haklarını güvence altına alan ve Türkmence dilinde eğitim olanağını tanıyan ilk yerel anayasa niteliğindedir. Irak Geçiş Dönemi Yönetimi Kanunu ve Irak’ın 2005 Yılı Anayasasını incelersek Türkmenleri ilgilendiren konuları aşağıdaki gibi sıralayabiliriz:
1. Kerkük Meselesi
Irak’ın Geçiş Dönemi Yönetimi Kanunu’nun 53. maddesinin (c) fıkrası, Bağdat ve Kerkük illeri dışında herhangi üç ilin (üç ilden fazla olmamak kaydıyla) birleşerek kendi aralarında bir bölgesel yönetim kurma hakkını tanımıştır. Görüldüğü gibi Kerkük, herhangi bir bölgesel yönetime ilhak edilememektedir. Bununla birlikte 58. madde, Irak’ın birçok bölgesinde özellikle de Kerkük’te gerçekleştirilen demografik değişiklikleri yok etmek için alınması gereken önlemlerden (referandum, sayım ve normalleştirme gibi) bahsetmektedir. Bütün bu işlemlerin, adalet ilkelerine uygun bir şekilde ve daimi anayasanın onaylanmasına kadar yapılması gerekir.
Irak’ın 2005 yılı Anayasası, 20 Mayıs 2006 tarihinde yürürlüğe girdiğinde, sadece Bağdat’ın kurulacak olan bölgesel yönetimlere katılamayacağı hükmü vardı. Bu Anayasa, sadece Bağdat’ı istisna kabul ederek Kerkük’e değinmedi ve Geçiş Kanunu’nun 58. maddesi hükümleri, Anayasa’nın 140. maddesine yerleştirildi ve 58. maddenin hükümlerinin yerine getirilmesi ve gereken işlemlerin (normalleştirme, sayım ve referandum) Kerkük’te en geç 31 Aralık 2007 tarihine kadar gerçekleştirme yetkisi yürütme erkine verildi. Peki, bu tarih geldiğine ve işlemler tamamlanamadığına göre, 140. maddenin geçerliliği sona ermiş olmaz mı?
2008 yılına ait 36 numaralı Yerel ve İl Meclisi Seçimi Kanunu’nun 23. maddesi, söz konusu seçimleri, idari, güvenlik yetkilerinin ve kamu görevlerinin paylaştırılmasını takip eden evreye erteledi. Söz konusu paylaştırma eşit bir şekilde olacaktır ve 7 kişiden oluşan bir komisyon oluşturulacaktır. Bu üyelerin 2’si Türkmen, 2’si Kürt, 2’si Arap ve 1’i Hıristiyan olacaktır. Bu üyeler, Temsilciler Meclisi üyeleri arasından seçilecektir. Söz konusu Komisyon’un en geç 31 Aralık 2008 tarihine kadar oluşturulması gerekiyordu. Gerçekten de bu komisyon kurulmuş ve Temsilciler Meclisi’ne aşağıda sayılan hususları içeren bir rapor sunmuştur:
a- Kerkük’te yetkilerin paylaştırılması mekanizması
b- Kerkük’te 9 Nisan 2003 tarihi öncesi ve sonrası gerçekleştirilen kamu ve özel mülkiyetlere tecavüzlerin belirlenmesi ve bunların geçerli olan kanunlara uygun olarak düzeltilmesi ve kaldırılması.
c- Kerkük nüfusu ile ilgili (seçmen kütüğü dahil) sicil ve verilerin incelenmesi ve gözden geçirilmesi ve bununla ilgili öneri ve tavsiyelerin Yüksek Seçim Kuruluna sunulması.
d- Komisyon, oluşturduğu raporunu, en geç 31 Mart 2009 tarihine kadar Temsilciler Meclisi’ne sunmalıdır. Temsilciler Meclisi de Komisyon’un işleyişini izler. Seçimler, Temsilciler Meclisi’nin hazırlayacağı özel kanuna uygun olarak yapılır; bu kanun, tek bir seçim dönemi için geçerli olacaktır. Böyle bir kanun çıkarılamazsa, Başkanlık Konseyi, Başbakanlık ve Temsilciler Meclisi Başkanlığı, Birleşmiş Milletler’in yardımıyla Kerkük’te seçimlerin yapılması için uygun koşulları belirler. Bütün bunlar, şimdiden söz konusu özel kanunun projesini hazırlamayı gerektirir. Bizim kanaatimize göre bu kanun şu hususları içermelidir: İdari ve güvenlik yetkileri ve kamu görevleri, %32’si Türkmenlere, %32’si Kürtlere, %32’si Araplara ve %4’ü Hıristiyanlara olmak üzere paylaştırılmalı ve güvenlik dosyası orduya teslim edilmelidir. Bu mecliste, Türkmenlere, Kürtlere ve Araplara onar sandalye ve Hıristiyanlara iki sandalye verilmelidir. Bu dağılım, ilçe ve bucak meclislerinde de geçerli olmalıdır.
2. Türkmence Eğitim Hakkı
Irak’ın Geçiş Dönemi Yönetimi Kanunu, ilk bakışta, Türkmence dili ile eğitim hakkı tanıyan ilk kanun olarak görülebilir. Ancak bu hakkı tanıyan ilk kanun, 1931 yılına ait 74 sayılı kanun olmuştur. Bu kanun; Kerkük, Kifri ve birçok ilçe ve bucak mahkemelerinde dilin, Türkçe olduğuna hükmetmişti. Dava dilekçeleri Türkçe sunulabilirdi ve mahkeme kararlarından Türkçe nüsha alınabilirdi. Bu kanunda ayrıca, Kerkük ve Kifri’de resmi dil Türkçe olarak tanımlanıyordu. Ancak bu hükümlerin uygulama alanı daha sonra sınırlandırıldı. En sonunda, Türkçe dili, sadece okullarda okutulan tek bir ders haline geldi. Bu kanunun hükümlerinin uygulanmasına, 1937 yılında son verildi; ancak yaptığımız araştırma ve incelemeler neticesinde, bu kanunun iptal edildiğine ilişkin hiçbir resmi gazete bulamadık. Dolayısıyla bu kanun geçerli olmakla birlikte uygulanmamaktadır. 1970 yılında ise, dağılmış olan Devrim Konseyi tarafından çıkarılan 89 sayılı karar, eğitimin sadece ilkokullarda Türkmence olacağı hususunu düzenledi. Bu karar uygulamaya konularak okullar açıldı. Ancak hükümet kısa bir sürede bu kararı inkâr edip Türkmenlere kötü muamele ve zarar vermeye başladı; diğer yandan Türkmen okullarını da kapattı.
Irak’ın Geçiş Dönemi Yönetimi Kanunu yayımlandığında, söz konusu kanunun 9. maddesi, Irak halkına, kamuya ait eğitim kurumlarında, ana dillerini öğretme ve öğrenme hakkı tanıdı. Bu hüküm daha sonra, “eğitim kurallarına uygun olarak” ibaresi eklenerek 2005 Anayasası’nın 4.maddesinin 1. bendine yerleştirildi. Kanaatimize göre, Arapça ve İngilizce’yi öğretmekle birlikte, eğitimin dilinin tüm aşamalarının Türkmence olması gerekir.
3. Resmi Dil Olarak Türkmence
2005 Anayasası’nın 4.maddesi, Türkmen nüfusunun yoğun olduğu idari birimlerde resmi dilin Türkmence olduğuna hükmetmektedir. Ancak bu madde nüfus yoğunluğu kavramına ve bu dilin kullanma alanları konusuna bir açıklık getirmemiştir. Bu nedenle bu hükmü daha etkin bir hale getirmeliyiz. Şahsi görüşüme göre bu hüküm, resmi dilin resmi kamu işlerinde, mahkemelerde, kamu dairelerinde kullanılması anlamına gelmektedir. Türkmence isimlerin mağazalara, sokaklara ve semtlere verilmesi, şikâyet ve başvuru dilekçelerinin Türkmence yazılması buna örnek olarak verilebilir.
4. İdari, Kültürel, Siyasi ve Eğitimsel Haklar
Irak’ın Geçiş Dönemi Yönetimi Kanunu’nun 53/d maddesi, Türkmenlerin idari, kültürel ve siyasi haklarını güvence altına alıyordu. Ancak bu madde bu hakların ne anlama geldiğini açıklamamıştı. 2005 Anayasası yürürlüğe girdiğinde 125. madde Türkmenler, Keldaniler ve Asurlular gibi çeşitli milletlerin kültürel, idari, siyasi ve eğitimsel haklarını güvence altına alıp bu hakları daha sonra çıkarılacak bir kanun ile düzenleyecekti. Ancak bu kanun şimdiye kadar çıkmadı. Biz kendi açımızdan bu hakları inceledik ve bunlarla ilgili düşünce ve önerilerimizi sunduk (Beşir Gazetesinin 20 numaralı ve 29/03/2004 tarihli sayısında yayımlanan “Türkmenlerin Hakları ve Yayımlanan Anayasa” başlıklı makaleme ve Bağdat’taki Baba Gürgür araştırmalar Merkezinin 2005 yılında yayımladığı Avrak Turkmaniyye dergisinin 93-112 sayfalarında “Irak Anayasalarında Türkmenlerin Hakları” başlıklı raporuma bakınız). Anayasa’daki madde hükmünün uygulanmasını sağlamak için bu hükmü düzenleyen kanunun çıkarılmasında katkıda bulunmalıyız. Bu nedenle de bu kanunla ilgili bir hazırlık çalışması niteliğinde olan bir proje sunduk ve Avrak Turkmaniyye dergisinin Temmuz 1006 sayısında yayımladık. Çalışmada sunduğumuz düşünce ve planlardan yararlanılabilir.
Sonuç
Sunduğumuz projede en önemli düşüncemiz, Tuzhurmatu ve Telafer’i birer ile dönüştürme fikridir. İle dönüştürülen Telafer ve Tuzhurmatunun valisi ve ayrıca Kerkük’ün valisi Türkmen olacaktır. Diğer Türkmen ilçelerinde de kaymakamlar ve mahkeme başkanları Türkmen olmalıdır. Kentler, ilçe ve bucaklar, köyler yeniden adlandırılmalı, daha doğrusu 1920 yılında taşıdığı isimler geri getirilmelidir. Devlet makamlarında ve önemli kamu kurumlarında Türkmenlerin de yeri olmalı ve devlet, Türkmence eğitime ve Türkmen kültürüne maddi ve manevi destekte bulunmalıdır. Son olarak, siyasi alanda çalışmalara ve siyasi teşekküllere fırsat verilmelidir.
Irak Danıştayı Eski Başkanı
The Mandeans, one of Iraq's most ancient sects
One of Iraq’s most ancient sects is on its way to become extinct after nearly 2,000 years of existence.The Mandeans, the world’s only surviving representatives of Gnosticism, have been living in southern Iraq since the 1st century A.D. But their existence is under serious threat.
Prior to the U.S. invasion, more than 30,000 lived in Iraq, mainly along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries."We fear for our lives particularly following several fatwas in which we are denied the status of the People of the Book," said Sheikh Sattar al-Hilou, the Mandeans’ chief in Iraq.
The term 'the People of the Book’ refers to non-Muslims who have been accorded special protection under Islamic Jurisprudence. The Koran calls them Ahl al-Kitab, a term, which besides Christians and Jews has historically covered the Mandeans.
Religious militias are using these fatwas, or religious decrees, against the Mandeans to force them to enter Islam, Hilou said.
He said he was not aware of anyone of his people converting to Islam despite threats of death."As a result more than 22,000 of my community have fled the country," he added.
He warned the Mandeans would cease to exist as the country’s most ancient sect if the government fails to protect them.The Mandeans are called in Iraq Subbas and for centuries they have been Iraq’s best goldsmiths and canoe makers.They are strongly pacifist and are not known to have ever resorted to violence.Former leader Saddam Hussein was very fond of the sect and had constructed a modern shrine for the Mandeans on the banks of the Tigris River in Baghdad.
The sect’s rituals, all of great antiquity, cannot be performed without flowing water, hence their preference to live close to rivers and streams.
Hilou said he believed less than 8,000 Mandeans were still living in Iraq and most of them away from their ancestral habitat.The Mandeans have extensive religious literature. Most important are their Ginza Raba (Great Treasure) and Drasha ed Yahia (Book of John).
John the Baptist is their most revered saint and they date their religion to him but historians believe their faith is of much older antiquity.
Saturday, 21 March 2009
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